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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the factors that influence write-off decisions in German-listed companies. 
Write-offs have been widely discussed, especially for the US-American market, and a relation to 
earnings management has been found in existing studies. German companies differentiate from 
the companies that have already been analyzed as they operate under different accounting 
standards (IFRS) and in a different institutional setting. Additionally, managers are confronted 
with the task to derive the IFRS annual statements from the existing annual statements according 
to local GAAP which follow a differing objective. Based on a sample of 805 observations of 
German companies listed in the DAX, MDAX, TecDax and SDAX indices between 2004 and 2010, 
we analyze the impact of firm performance as well as reporting incentives on the write-off 
decision. We find that the write-off probability rises significantly with decreasing overall firm 
performance, which is in line with the legal requirements. Additionally, we find a strong relation 
of the write-off probability with unexpectedly high earnings, which is an indicator for income 
smoothing. Besides influencing the shareholder’s perception, income smoothing can serve to 
minimize overall tax payments or to influence the bank’s risk assessment. In contrast with prior 
studies focusing on the US-American market, we found no evidence for other capital market 
motives, like big bath accounting and management changes; neither could we confirm the 
hypothesis that earnings-based management compensation or leverage have a significant 
influence on the write-off decision. These results indicate that German managers aim to influence 
tax payments and potential lenders in contrast to the perception of potential shareholders. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ccording to IAS 36 Impairment of Assets, companies applying International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) are required to perform annual tests to detect the existence of indications that the 
value of long-lived assets covered by the scope of the standard may be impaired. If such an 
indication exists, the company is required to calculate the recoverable amount and compare it to the carrying amount 
of the asset under consideration. Although IAS 36 provides a detailed description of how to calculate the 
recoverable amount, the calculation entails large areas of discretion. As the recoverable amount is usually deduced 
from future expected cash flows, a situation arises in which information is distributed asymmetrically because 
management has more information than investors regarding future strategy and development, which gives rise to 
earnings management (Schipper, 1989). In our study, we examine the factors that influence the write-off decision for 
German-listed companies.  
 
Earnings management concerning the recognition of write-offs has been discussed in several studies. 
However, the existing literature has been mainly focused on the US-American market (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006; 
Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004). Little research has been conducted regarding the European IFRS setting and, to 
the best of our knowledge, there does not exist a study on write-offs under IFRS in Germany. We concentrate on 
Germany for two reasons. First, their publicly listed companies have been required to prepare their consolidated 
financial statements based on IFRS since 2005. Second, the institutional setting in Germany varies materially from 
that in the USA, which may give interesting insights for other countries with similar institutional settings. 
A 
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The regulations concerning fixed asset write-offs vary between the US-GAAP and IFRS regimes, 
especially regarding the techniques used to decide whether a write-off is realized. ASC 360-10 Impairment and 
Disposal of Long-Lived Assets (formerly SFAS 144) requires a company to test the asset for recoverability as an 
initial step, by comparing the carrying amount with the sum of the estimated future undiscounted cash flows from 
further use of the asset. As a second step, the write-off amount is calculated as the difference between the carrying 
amount and the fair value of the asset. IAS 36 requires the company to compare the recoverable amount (the higher 
of value in use and fair value less costs to sell) with the carrying amount. If the carrying amount exceeds the 
recoverable amount, the asset is impaired and is required to be written off by the difference between the two 
amounts. Thus, according to IFRS, the write-off decision and the write-off amount are technically decided within the 
same step, while two steps are required according to US-GAAP. This may lead to differing factors influencing the 
write-off decision according to the two systems. 
 
The USA can be classified as a common-law country with high shareholder protection, relatively low 
creditor protection, low ownership concentration, and a developed equity market; therefore, the regime is market-
centered (La Porta et al., 1998). In contrast, Germany is a code-law country with low shareholder protection, high 
creditor protection, high ownership concentration, and an underdeveloped equity market; therefore, it is a bank-
centered regime. Leuz et al. (2003) show that companies in countries with high investor protection, low ownership 
concentration, and developed equity markets engage less in earnings management, suggesting different patterns of 
earnings management in the USA and Germany. 
 
Additionally, the German GAAP, which are still used to prepare individual financial statements, are 
materially influenced by stakeholder orientation. This stakeholder orientation results in prudence being the 
overriding principle, which means that losses have to be realized sooner rather than later, in contrast with gains 
which may only be realized when they occur. Furthermore, there exists a close link between tax accounting and 
local GAAP, motivating companies to manipulate their individual financial statements to minimize tax payments. 
Even though companies are required to reconcile their individual financial statements to IFRS for the preparation of 
consolidated financial statements, we assume that national reporting practice influences the reporting according to 
IFRS; similarly, Kvaal and Nobes (2012) find that national patterns in financial reporting practice persist over time. 
 
The results of our analysis show that the write-off decisions of German-listed companies are materially 
influenced by firm performance. In contrast with different studies on the US-American market, we do not find big 
bath accounting to be significant, but we do find that the write-off decision is materially influenced by income 
smoothing. This finding is of interest to local and international regulatory and supervisory bodies, as well as to 
shareholders, lenders and financial analysts. IFRS are designed to provide useful information for (potential) 
shareholders of a company. All attempts at earnings management work against the fair presentation. Hence, to 
receive useful information, investors need to anticipate methods to manage earnings. As Leuz et al. (2003) show, 
earnings management decreases in enforcement. To reduce earnings management, it is necessary to empower 
enforcement at specific points, which requires the government to be conscious of what methods of earnings 
management are used. 
 
2. PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Prior Research 
 
In this section, we will give a short overview of the existing literature regarding the factors influencing the 
fixed asset write-offs. We are aware that there has been an extensive amount of research conducted in this area and 
therefore, we will concentrate our literature review on the most influential studies which use similar regression 
models to ours. 
 
Most of the existing literature examines the US-American market, but little research has been done that 
focuses on the write-off decision itself. Minnick (2011) examines the relation of the write-off decision with 
corporate governance. She finds a positive relation of percentage of outside directors, shareholder protection, pay-
performance sensitivity, and CEO turnover with the write-off decision and a negative relation of board size and the 
write-off decision. By analyzing good and bad governed companies separately, she finds that write-offs of good 
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governed companies are related to economic factors while those of bad governed companies are opportunistic. 
Additionally, she finds that good governed companies realize smaller write-offs than bad governed companies do 
because the latter recognize the loss only when it is so big that it cannot be ignored anymore. Loh and Tan (2002) 
analyze macroeconomic and firm-specific factors that influence the write-off decision of companies in Singapore. 
They find that the unemployment rate, the GDP growth rate, the occupancy rate of properties and management 
changes are important determinants, whereas variables like the debt to asset ratio seem to be less significant. Francis 
et al. (1996) analyze the causes of write-offs of US-American companies before the adoption of SFAS 121 
Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to be Disposed Of and find 
significant evidence for the influence of management changes and write-off history on the frequency and magnitude 
of write-offs. Interestingly, the authors additionally find evidence against the income smoothing and big bath theory, 
since write-offs decrease in firm-years with unexpectedly high and unexpectedly poor performance. 
 
Riedl (2004) compares the write-off characteristics of US-American companies before and after the 
adoption of SFAS 121. He finds that write-offs were more closely related to management incentives and less closely 
related to economic effects after the change in accounting regulations. During the post-SFAS 121 period, he shows 
that there is a significant correlation between management changes, as well as big bath accounting, and the 
magnitude of write-offs, but both factors were insignificant during the pre-SFAS 121 period. Beatty and Weber 
(2006) conduct a two-stage analysis estimating a joint probit and censored regression to analyze factors influencing 
the goodwill write-off decision and write-off magnitude in the SFAS 142 Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets 
adoption period. What makes these write-offs special is that in the transition period, managers have to choose 
between a certain current write-off below the line and an uncertain future write-off included in income from 
continuing operations. Among other things, the authors find that where net worth covenants exclude the effect of 
accounting changes, the frequency and magnitude of SFAS 142 write-offs rises for firms with a relatively high risk 
of future write-offs if a potential future above the line write-off will be highly capitalized and if the bonus-based 
compensation plan explicitly excludes special items. Furthermore, the probability and magnitude of SFAS 142 
write-offs decreases if the firm is traded on an exchange with explicit delisting requirements and in the tenure of the 
CEO, which the authors explain by the fact that a shorter CEO tenure increases the probability that the actual CEO 
did not make the original acquisition. 
 
Cotter et al. (1998) investigate the determinants of the magnitude of write-offs of Australian companies, 
focusing on management incentives. They find a significant relation between management changes and the 
magnitude of write-offs. They also find a relationship with the amount of cash reserves, which they interpret as the 
capacity to absorb write-offs. Interestingly the authors do not find a significant impact on the magnitude of write-
offs in respect of governance mechanisms, such as the existence of an audit committee and auditing by the Big Six 
auditors. 
 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) analyze the impact of earnings management on the goodwill write-off decision 
and its magnitude in the UK after the mandatory adoption of IFRS 3. The authors elaborate on the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms in detail and find that goodwill write-offs are materially influenced by 
management incentives, like management changes, big bath accounting and income smoothing. However, due to the 
strong relationship between goodwill write-offs and good governance, they argue that managers use their discretion 
to convey private information rather than to manage earnings opportunistically. Finally, Garrod et al. (2008) analyze 
the write-off decision and its magnitude in small privately-held companies in Slovenia. They report that in the 
absence of agency problems and in an environment with high alignment between financial and tax reporting, 
companies tend to manage earnings using current asset write-offs, whereas fixed asset write-offs seem to be 
influenced mostly by regulatory factors. 
 
2.1.1. Development Of Hypotheses 
 
2.1.2. The Write-off Decision 
 
According to IAS 36, a company is required to assess whether there is an indication that the asset under 
consideration may be impaired at the end of each reporting period. In making this assessment, as a minimum, the 
company is required to consider internal and external factors described in IAS 36.12 as follows: 
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 obsolescence or physical damage of an asset 
 significant changes in the extent to which an asset is used 
 economic performance of the asset is worse than expected 
 
If there is an indication that the asset may be impaired, the recoverable amount of the asset must be 
calculated and compared to the carrying amount. A positive difference between carrying amount and recoverable 
amount must be written off. The recoverable amount is defined as the higher of value in use and fair value less costs 
to sell, where the value in use is the present value of future cash flows from further use of the asset and its final 
disposal. Ideally, the fair value less costs to sell shall be derived from a binding sale agreement. If a sale agreement 
does not exist, it is to be derived from an active market or, failing that, from the best information available to reflect 
the amount that an entity could obtain, at the end of the reporting period, from the disposal of the asset in an arm’s 
length transaction between knowledgeable willing parties, after deducting the cost of disposal. As a binding sale 
agreement will rarely be available and for most assets an active market does not exist, the fair value less costs to sell 
is typically calculated as the present value of future cash flows that a market participant could gain with the asset. In 
contrast to the calculation of the value in use, firm-specific factors, like synergies, may not be included.  
 
The assessment of whether an indication exists that the asset may be impaired, as well as the calculation of 
the recoverable amount, requires insider knowledge with respect to the status, usage and profitability of the asset 
under consideration, giving the management room for individual judgment. According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), 
“earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on accounting numbers”. The occurrence of earnings 
management thus depends on the existence of certain reporting incentives that motivate the management to 
manipulate earnings. We assume that the write-off decision is affected by both a decrease in the recoverable amount 
of the asset under the carrying amount, which we will call impairment, as well as reporting incentives. 
 
2.1.3. Impairment 
 
IAS 36 requires a write-off to be recognized whenever an asset’s recoverable amount falls below the asset’s 
carrying amount. The calculation of the recoverable amount is only required if there is an indication that the asset 
may be impaired. Following Cotter et al. (1998), we argue that if there is an indication that the asset may be 
impaired and the carrying amount exceeds the recoverable amount, the management has an incentive to write off for 
at least two reasons - legal liability to recognize the write-off and the comparative advantage of providing 
information about their firm’s expected future cash flows. La Porta et al. (1998) classify Germany as a country with 
relatively high enforcement and therefore, non-compliance with the accounting standards is relatively risky. The 
identification of companies that have assets which are impaired is based on the assumption that impairment is 
associated with poor firm performance. Hence, we suggest our first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  The write-off probability is higher for companies with worse performance. 
 
 We include three proxies for firm performance in our analysis, the choice of which is, in part, influenced by 
the specification of IAS 36. Furthermore, as we have no information on the firm’s estimates of future performance, 
we include variables measuring current performance in our analysis, as the estimates of future performance are 
usually based on these. The first proxy is income before write-offs. IAS 36.14 (b) states that operating profits that 
are worse than expected are an indicator that the asset might be impaired. Thus, we expect a negative correlation 
between the write-off probability and income before write-offs. As the calculation of the recoverable amount is 
mostly based on expected future cash flows, our second proxy for firm performance is the operating cash flow of the 
company. IAS 36.14 (b) also states that net cash flows that are worse than expected indicate that the asset might be 
impaired. Therefore, we expect a negative correlation between the write-off probability and the operating cash flow. 
The necessity to write off follows from the relation of market value to carrying amount. Thus, our third proxy for 
firm performance is the market-to-book ratio. IAS 36.12 (d) identifies a market-to-book ratio below one as an 
indicator that the asset under consideration is impaired. As with earnings before write-offs and the operating cash 
flow, we expect a negative correlation between the market-to-book ratio and the write-off probability. 
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2.1.4. Reporting Incentives 
 
Following Healy and Wahlen (1999), we divide reporting incentives into two broad groups - capital market 
motivations and contracting motivations. We do not explicitly analyze regulatory requirements since we do not 
partition our sample by industries. We incorporate overall regulations in our analysis through control variables such 
as firm size. 
 
2.1.4.1. Capital Market Motivations 
 
The perception of the company by stock market participants is probably one of the most important targets 
for management since actual and potential shareholders control the share price. Therefore, positively influencing 
their perception is probably one of management’s main incentives. One way to achieve this goal might be to manage 
current year’s earnings performance. Following the extensive income smoothing literature, we assume that good 
earnings performance is related to a high write-off probability. The idea behind this is that the management tries to 
meet the shareholders’ expectations. According to Moses (1987), we can define income smoothing as an “effort to 
reduce fluctuations in reported earnings”, meaning that the management uses the write-off decision as a “smoothing 
device” to reduce the divergence of reported earnings from the expected number. The notion of income smoothing is 
based on the assumption that shareholders perceive actual earnings as a signal for future earnings and that smoothed 
earnings allow for more precise forecasts, which the capital market rewards with higher share prices. In support of 
this assumption, Kasznik and McNichols (1999) report that even though financial analysts do not adjust their 
forecasts for companies that consecutively meet their expectations, the market grants a market premium. 
 
In the German setting, there are two further arguments for income smoothing. Regarding the individual 
annual statements, high tax-book conformity exists. According to Graham and Smith (1999), high tax-book 
conformity is an incentive to smooth earnings because it reduces overall tax expenses under a progressive tax rate. 
Since we assume that not all earnings management will be undone in the reconciliation process, the income 
smoothing in individual annual statements will impact the consolidated financial statements according to IFRS. The 
second argument is that debt financing is relatively important in Germany because the equity market is 
underdeveloped. According to Trueman and Titman (1988), material debt financing is an incentive to smooth 
earnings because if the lender observes a low volatility in the company’s earnings, the assessment of the probability 
of bankruptcy is lowered, which in turn results in decreased borrowing costs.  
 
Some empirical studies (e.g. Francis et al., 1996) find significant evidence for the existence of income 
smoothing in the write-off decision, but other studies find that there is no such relationship (e.g. Riedl, 2004). We 
assume that managers apply income smoothing, meaning that impairment losses will be recognized in years with 
unexpectedly high income before impairment losses: 
 
H2: Companies with unexpectedly high earnings before write-offs have a higher write-off probability. 
 
Closely related to the assumption of income smoothing is that of big bath accounting. Big bath accounting 
means that the management accumulates problems until it finally recognizes a huge write-off in a year in which the 
company has realized an unexpectedly low income anyway. Following this approach offers several advantages (see 
Strong and Meyer, 1987). First, management in this way establishes a safety cushion for subsequent years in which 
it will be easier to meet the shareholders’ expectations. Second, it is argued that recognizing a large one-time loss 
signals that past problems have been solved. The third advantage is merely arithmetic - lowering earnings in the 
current year ensures high earnings growth for the future. Another more psychological argument on which the big 
bath technique may be based is that if the situation is already bad, making it a little worse will, in most cases, do no 
harm either to management reputation or to earnings expectations (see Walsh et al., 1991). Thus, we assume that 
managers apply big bath accounting, meaning that write-offs will be realized in years with unexpectedly low income 
before write-offs: 
 
H3: Companies with unexpectedly low earnings before write-offs have a higher write-off probability. 
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 While H2 and H3 seem to be contradictory at first sight, Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) prove that if 
the reporting environment permits discretion, the optimal strategy of management is to smooth income if good news 
occurs and use big bath accounting if bad news occurs. 
 
Another incentive that influences the write-off decision is a change in management. There are different 
reasons for incoming managers to recognize write-offs in their first year (see Wells, 2002). One of these is that they 
are not held responsible for past performance and thus, they may explicitly attribute the write-off to the preceding 
management. This is often referred to as “cleaning the decks”, illustrating the fact that new managers tend to 
recognize write-offs that have been delayed in prior years. In this way, it is possible to anticipate future losses 
without any loss of reputation, resulting in increasing earnings in subsequent years. The result of high write-offs in 
the first year is that income in future years is relieved of these expenses so that an improving earnings trend can be 
reported from the first year of tenure onwards. In support of this theory, Moore (1973) finds that companies with 
recent management changes show a significantly greater proportion of income-reducing discretionary accounting 
decisions. A number of studies report the same result for the relationship between management changes and write-
offs (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006; Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004), whereas others find no significant relationship 
(e.g. Cotter et al., 1998). 
 
H4: Firm-years in which a management change has occurred have a higher write-off probability. 
 
2.1.4.2. Contracting Motivations 
 
There are different kinds of contracts that rely on accounting data. Two kinds that are frequently used are 
credit agreements and management compensation contracts, where credit agreements are usually tied to leverage and 
management compensation contracts often refer to earnings. The leverage of the company under consideration may 
influence credit agreements in two ways. First, the level of borrowing costs is based on the assessment of financial 
risk for which leverage is an important determinant, meaning that higher leverage can result in higher borrowing 
costs. Second, most credit agreements contain strict regulations concerning leverage, called debt covenants. The 
breach of a given covenant can lead to an immediate repayment claim from the creditor, which would result in 
extensive liquidity problems for most companies. Following the results of Duke and Hunt (1990), leverage can be 
used as a proxy for the closeness to debt covenant restrictions. Sweeney (1994) also provides evidence in support of 
the hypothesis that managers of firms approaching technical default respond with income-increasing accounting 
changes. Regarding the write-off decision, this means that the write-off probability decreases, delivering our fifth 
hypothesis: 
 
H5:  Companies with higher leverage have a lower write-off probability. 
 
Management compensation is commonly divided into a fixed and a variable part, where the latter has a 
short-term and a long-term component. The short-term component is usually based on a measure of the company’s 
success, whereas the long-term component contains a stock-option plan. If write-offs influence the figure standing 
for success (e.g. EBIT, profit), we assume that the management has an incentive to delay write-offs to later years in 
order to increase the current period’s income (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Similarly, Beatty and Weber 
(2006) find that bonus plans that do not explicitly exclude write-offs reduce the write-off probability. Therefore, our 
sixth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H6: Companies which grant managers earnings-based bonuses that are affected by write-offs have a lower 
write-off probability. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Sample Selection 
 
Our full sample is comprised of all the non-financial German companies that were listed in the German 
DAX, MDAX, TecDax and SDAX indices between 2004 and 2010, with a complete IFRS dataset available in the 
Worldscope database. To be able to calculate variables that refer to previous year data, such as expected earnings, 
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we had to exclude the first observation and the first observation after a gap for all companies. Our full sample 
contains 165 firms, providing 805 firm-years. To test for the influence of management changes and earnings-based 
bonus payments, we hand-collected information on these two variables as described below for all companies that 
were listed in HDAX (a combination of DAX, MDAX and TecDax) between 2004 and 2010. Therefore, we 
excluded from the sample all companies that were not listed in HDAX during the period under consideration and 
additionally had to exclude a further 170 and 182 observations for the management change sample and the earnings-
based bonus sample, respectively, due to a lack of information. Table 1 (see Appendix) describes the process of 
sample selection for all three samples. 
 
3.2.1. Model and Variable Measurement 
 
Since the decision to write off is a dichotomous variable, we used a probit regression to examine the 
influence of the impairment and reporting incentives described above on the write-off decision. We include multiple 
firm-years of the companies examined in our analysis and thus apply a panel research design. To implement our 
analysis, we use the following random effects probit regression: 
 
Pr (WOit  = 1) = β0 + β1 INCOMEit + β2 OCFit + β3 MTBit  
+ β4 BIGBATHit + β5 INCSMOOTHit + β6 DTAit  
+ β7 FIRMSIZEit + β8 BIG4it + β9 LISTINGit + β10-15YEARt + εit. (1) 
 
 To test the influence of management changes, we run the following probit regression on our management 
change sample: 
 
Pr (WOit  = 1) = β0 + β1 INCOMEit + β2 OCFit + β3 MTBit  
+ β4 BIGBATHit + β5 INCSMOOTHit + β6 DTAit + β7 MCit 
+ β8 FIRMSIZEit + β9 BIG4it + β10 LISTINGit + β11-16YEARt + εit. (2) 
 
 Similarly, to analyze the influence of earnings-based bonus payments, we run the following probit 
regression on our earnings-based bonus sample: 
 
Pr (WOit  = 1) = β0 + β1 INCOMEit + β2 OCFit + β3 MTBit  
+ β4 BIGBATHit + β5 INCSMOOTHit + β6 DTAit + β7 EBBit 
+ β8 FIRMSIZEit + β9 BIG4it + β10 LISTINGit + β11-16YEARt + εit. (3) 
 
The endogenous variable, WOit, is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if company i recognizes 
a write-off in t and takes the value of 0 otherwise. We calculate total write-offs as the sum of write-offs on goodwill, 
other intangibles and property, plant and equipment. In contrast to Garrod et al. (2008), current asset write-offs are 
not included in the analysis as they are excluded from the scope of IAS 36. Hence, the dichotomous variable, WOit, 
is equal to 1 whenever total write-offs exceed 0. We decided to represent the independent non-indicator variables as 
ratios rather than as levels to control for scale. Thus, INCOMEit represents the net income of company i in t 
corrected for any write-offs divided by total assets of company i in t-1. OCFit is company i’s operating cash flow in t 
divided by total assets of company i int-1. MTBit represents company i’s market-to-book ratio in t. Similar to Francis 
et al. (1996), to proxy for income smoothing and big bath accounting, we first calculate an earnings management 
indicator, EMIit, which is the difference of company i’s net income in t corrected for taxes and write-offs and 
company i’s earnings before taxes in t-1 divided by company i’s total assets in t-1. The definition of the earnings 
management indicator is based on the choice of a random walk model for the development of earnings before taxes, 
predicting actual earnings being equal to last year’s earnings (see Moses, 1987). If the earnings before taxes and 
write-offs in t are unexpectedly high, the earnings management indicator takes a positive value; if they are 
unexpectedly low, it is negative. INCOMESMOOTHit proxies for income smoothing of company i in t. It takes the 
value of the earnings management indicator, EMIit, if this exceeds 0 and is 0 otherwise. We do not proxy for income 
smoothing using a dichotomous variable because if the management tries to smooth earnings, the necessity to write 
off rises with the degree to which actual and expected earnings deviate. Similarly, BIGBATHit proxies for big bath 
accounting of company i in t and equals the earnings management indicator, EMIit, if this falls below 0 and is 0 
otherwise. As the choice of the ratio used to proxy for leverage does not play an important role (see Duke and Hunt, 
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1990), we use DTAit, which represents the ratio of total debt of company i in t divided by total assets of company i in 
t.  
 
The variables MCit and EBBit were hand-collected. Healy (1985) argues that compensation plans will 
generally contain upper and lower bounds and prove that management has an incentive to choose income-increasing 
accruals (i.e., no write-off) only if neither the lower nor the upper bound defined in the bonus plan is binding. If one 
of these bounds is binding, the management has an incentive to choose income-decreasing accruals (i.e., to write off) 
in order to maximize their future payments. We collected the information on compensation plans from annual 
reports. Due to a lack of information on bounds or exact measurement for the earnings-based compensation, we 
decided to proxy for earnings-based bonus payments using the dichotomous variable, EBBit, which equals 1 if the 
management receives earnings-based bonus payments that are affected by write-offs and is 0 otherwise. We exclude 
those firm-years for which we only found general statements in the annual reports. The information on management 
changes was collected from the home page of the DGAP Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc-Publizitaet mbH, which 
is a portal that companies can use to fulfill the duty to publish ad hoc disclosures. MCit is a dichotomous variable 
that equals 1 if changes in the management board of company i occurred in t and is 0 otherwise. Companies that do 
not use the services of DGAP were excluded from the sample. 
 
In addition to the variables measuring the hypothesized effects, we included some control variables 
measuring other factors that could influence the tendency to write off. Following the existing literature, we include 
measures for company- size, the size of the auditor and listing on foreign stock exchanges. FIRMSIZEit is the natural 
logarithm of the total assets of company i in t. BIG4it is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if company i was audited 
by a Big 4 Four audit company in t and 0 otherwise. Finally, LISTINGit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if company 
i was listed on a foreign stock exchange in t and 0 otherwise. YEARt are dummy variables for the observation year, 
which we included to control for macroeconomic effects. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptives And Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 2 (see Appendix) provides descriptive statistics for our sample firms. 
 
We find that a write-off was realized in about 60% of our sample firms-years. Average income before 
write-offs amounts to 4% of lagged total assets, and average operating cash flow is about 9% of lagged total assets. 
The mean market-to-book ratio amounts to 2.56. We further find that the average leverage amounts to 20.82%. In 
about 83% of our earnings-based bonus payments sample-firm-years, managers received earnings-based bonus 
payments that were affected by write-offs. In about 26% of the management change sample-firm-years, a 
management change had occurred. 
 
Table 3 (see Appendix) partitions the observations according to those firm-years in which a write-off was 
recognized and those in which there was no write-off.  
 
Regarding the impairment variables, we find the net income before write-offs to be significantly higher for 
non-write-off firm-years than for write-off firm-years; this is consistent with prior research. Interestingly, we do not 
find significant differences in mean values between the two groups in respect of operating cash flow and market-to-
book ratio, indicating that managers base their write-off decision on earnings measures rather than on cash flow 
measures. Regarding the reporting incentives, we find significant differences in the means of leverage, management 
change and earnings-based bonus payments. Contrary to our expectations, the mean leverage is higher for write-off 
firm-years than for non write-off firm-years, which argues against Hypothesis 5 that the managers of companies 
with high leverage will try to delay write-offs. Instead, it supports the impairment hypothesis that companies in a 
worse financial situation; i.e., which are higher leveraged, will have a higher write-off probability. As expected, the 
mean management change indicator is significantly higher for write-off firm-years, indicating that incoming 
managers tend to realize write-offs either to clean the decks or to anticipate future losses, or both. Consistent with 
our expectations, the mean earnings-based bonus payment indicator is significantly lower for write-off firm-years, 
suggesting that managers who receive compensations that do not exclude write-off effects write off less frequently 
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than managers whose compensation is not affected by write-offs. We do not find significant differences in terms of 
our big bath proxy or our income smooth proxy. Additionally, we find that write-off firm-years are associated with 
significantly higher company size, higher frequency of auditing by a Big Four audit company, and listing on a 
foreign exchange. 
 
Table 4 (see Appendix) reports the pairwise Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for all variables 
analyzed. The correlations are relatively low, showing that our results are not influenced by multicolliniarity.  
 
4.2. Regression Results 
 
4.2.1. Impairment Variables 
 
Table 5 (see Appendix) presents the results from our three probit regressions.  
 
Regarding the impairment variables, we find net income before write-offs to be significant at the 1% level 
for all three models. The sign is negative as predicted, indicating that lower income is associated with higher write-
off probability. This confirms Hypothesis 1 that the write-off probability rises with decreasing firm performance. 
Operating cash flow is insignificant for all three models. This result shows that contrary to what the standard-setter 
requires, the write-off decision does not seem to be based on the expected cash flows but on the accruals-based 
measure of income before write-offs. Alternatively, this insignificance could result from using the overall operating 
cash flow as proxy for the free cash flow generated by the assets tested for write-offs.  
 
Contrary to our expectations, the market-to-book ratio has a positive sign for all three models, indicating 
that the write-off probability increases with increasing market-to-book ratio. However, this result is significant at the 
10% level for model 1 and model 3 only, and completely insignificant in model 2, including the management change 
indicator. Thus it is not very robust. The positive sign could indicate that the market-to-book ratio cannot be 
interpreted as an indicator for the market value of the asset being higher than its book value, resulting in no necessity 
to write-off, but instead it should be interpreted as a measure for growth options. Cotter et al. (1998) argue that a 
high market-to-book ratio results from high growth options and that companies with high growth options are riskier 
and thus more susceptible to write-offs. 
 
4.2.2. Reporting Incentives 
 
Regarding the reporting incentives, we find a significant positive influence of income smoothing at the 1% 
level for models 1 and 3 and at the 5% level for model 2, while big bath and leverage are insignificant for all three 
models. Thus, our findings support Hypothesis 2 while we have to reject Hypotheses 3 and 5. Analyzing the US-
American market, Riedl (2004) found the opposite results, with a significant negative influence of unexpectedly low 
earnings being a sign of big bath accounting - a significant negative influence of leverage supporting his debt-
covenant hypothesis and no significant influence of income smoothing. 
 
The insignificance of big bath in this study could result from the German setting. As stated earlier, German 
companies’ individual financial statements are driven by prudence and creditor protection, as well as the attempt to 
minimize tax payments. These factors result in a tendency to recognize expenses sooner rather than later and in good 
years rather than in bad. Due to credibility considerations, the early realization of losses in the individual and tax 
statements also results in an early realization of losses in the consolidated financial statements according to IFRS. 
The insignificance of leverage could result from the assumption that leverage can be used to proxy for the closeness 
to debt covenants. Additionally, German companies historically rely heavily on debt and a high leverage, in most 
cases, leads to the banks being more attentive to possible earnings-increasing procedures, thereby reducing the room 
for earnings management. Regarding the management change variable in model 2, we could not find a significant 
influence, indicating that German managers do not tend to realize write-offs in their first year. The insignificance 
could also result from the fact that we considered all changes in the management board to be of interest and did not 
differentiate between different positions or situations. The earnings-based bonus payment indicator in model 3 is just 
below the 10% level of significance (i.e., 11.4%). This insignificance could result from the fact that we did not 
account for caps and floors of the compensation plans due to a lack of information. 
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4.2.3. Control Variables 
 
We find a significant positive relationship between the write-off probability and the company size in all 
three models. Auditing by a Big Four audit company has a significant influence in model 2 at the 5% level, but is 
insignificant in models 1 and 3. The indicator for listing on a foreign stock exchange is only marginally significant 
in model 1 and insignificant in models 2 and 3. Untabulated year-dummies have positive signs (except for 2007 
which is negative), but all are insignificant except for 2006 in model 1. As the financial crises had not begun in 2006 
but GDP was rising significantly instead, the significant positive influence could result either from income 
smoothing or from a learning effect after mandatory IFRS-adoption in 2005. In model 2, 2006 is also insignificant 
and 2007 becomes positive, while 2008 and 2009 are negative. In model 3, all year dummies are positive. The year 
2006 is significant at the 1% level and 2008 becomes significant at the 10% level. This could be interpreted as the 
influence of the financial crises, but it is a weak result due to a lack of robustness. 
 
4.3. Sensitivity 
 
To validate our findings, we conducted a series of sensitivity analyses. Results are presented in Table 6 (see 
Appendix).  
 
We replaced net income before write-offs with the return on assets, operating cash flow with sales and the 
market-to-book ratio with the change in market-to-book ratio compared with the preceding year. Additionally, we 
estimated our model using a panel logit regression. Finally, we excluded all observations from 2005 because that 
was the year of mandatory IFRS adoption. Net income (or return on assets), the income smooth variable and 
company size remained significant at the 1% level through all variations. The operating cash flow becomes 
marginally significant with a positive sign if we include market-to-book ratio change instead of market-to-book 
ratio, but it remains insignificant in all other model specifications. A positive influence of operating cash flow on the 
write-off probability implies that the operating cash flow does not proxy for impairment but for the capacity to 
absorb write-offs, as Cotter et al. (1998) argue. The significance of market-to-book ratio fluctuates from 4.4% to 
16% between the different variations, always with a positive sign. Market-to-book ratio change is insignificant. Big 
bath and leverage remain insignificant through all model variations as well as auditing by a Big Four audit company. 
The indicator variable for the listing on a foreign stock exchange falls just below the 10% significance level if we 
include the return on assets instead of the income before write-offs. Overall, we find that the write-off decision is 
materially influenced by income before write-offs, income smoothing and the firm size and that this main result is 
not altered by different model variations. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study investigates the factors that influence write-off decisions in German companies applying IFRS. 
We find that the write-off probability materially increases in situations of decreasing net income before write-offs 
and in a context of increasing firm size. Furthermore, the write-off decision is materially influenced by income 
smoothing. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that earnings management behavior in Germany materially 
deviates from that in Anglo-American countries like the USA. The write-off decision is materially influenced by 
income smoothing, while other reporting incentives do not have a significant impact. In contrast to prior studies – 
most of which analyze the US-American market – we could find no evidence for big bath accounting and neither 
were there relationships between write-offs and earnings-based bonus payments, management changes or leverage. 
 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, only a minimal amount of research has 
been conducted regarding the write-off decision under IFRS, with the existing research mainly focusing on the US-
American market. As there are material differences between US-GAAP and IFRS, especially regarding the write-off 
decision, our study gives insights into the importance of earnings management in the application of IAS 36. Second, 
we analyze the write-off behavior in a different institutional setting. Germany is a bank-centered code-law country 
with low shareholder protection, high creditor protection, high ownership concentration and an underdeveloped 
equity market. Therefore, the incentives for earnings management are likely to be very different for German firms 
than for US-American firms since the USA is a market-centered common-law country with high shareholder 
protection, relatively low creditor protection, low ownership concentration and a developed equity market. 
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Our results are of interest to German regulatory and supervisory bodies as they prove that German 
companies apply significant discretion in their write-off decisions, which could possibly be decreased by focusing 
enforcement on this special issue. Additionally, our findings should be of interest to all shareholders and lenders, as 
well as financial analysts, in interpreting financial reports according to IFRS. Further, the results are of interest to 
the IASB as we provide evidence that the regulation gives room for earnings management and its use in Germany. 
 
However, our study is subject to some limitations. First, our definition of the management change variable 
is based on the assumption that all changes in the management board matter. A further analysis of changes in 
different positions on the management board could provide further insight into the influence of management 
changes. Second, the definition of the earnings-based compensation variable does not include the fact that most 
compensation plans have caps and floors. If this information was available and included in a similar study, 
additional insight could be gained regarding the impact of management compensation. Finally, because we only 
analyzed German publicly listed companies, we could not analyze the effect of different institutional settings. 
Therefore, we cannot definitely identify what leads German companies to apply income smoothing extensively – 
whether it results from being bank-centered, from tax-book conformity, or from other factors. Hence, in future 
research, it could be interesting to analyze the write-off decision under IFRS in a set of European companies.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1:  Sample Selection 
  
Full Sample Management Change Sample 
Earnings-Based Bonus Payments 
Sample 
  Companiesb Firm-Years Companiesb Firm-Years Companiesb Firm-Years 
Companies Listed In DAX, MDAX, Tecdax Or SDAX Between 
2004 And 2010  
229 1603 229 1603 229 1603 
Financial companies (35) (245) (35) (245) (35) (245) 
Not German (17) (119) (17) (119) (17) (119) 
No complete dataset 
 
(166) 
 
(166) 
 
(166) 
No IFRS 
 
(88) 
 
(88) 
 
(88) 
First firm-yearsa 
 
(180) 
 
(180) 
 
(180) 
Non-HDAX company 
  
(47) (223) (47) (223) 
No sufficient data on management changes 
   
(170) 
  
No sufficient data on earnings-based bonus payments 
     
(182) 
Final sample of firm-years 165 805 85 412 98 400 
a   For the calculation of ratios that revert to previous year data the first observation of each company and the first observation after a gap in the data had to be excluded. 
b   The number of companies excluded from the sample is given for financial, foreign and non-HDAX companies only, as the other criteria usually change from year to year and 
thus do not result in the exclusion of a whole company on a stand-alone basis. However, the combination of different exclusion criteria might well result in the complete exclusion 
of a company. Therefore, the final sample of firms cannot be calculated from the numbers given above because the sample reduced due to companies that were eliminated 
cumulatively because of an incomplete dataset, no IFRS, the first reporting periods and a lack of sufficient data on management changes/earnings-based bonus payments. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
25%- 
Quantile 
Median 
75%- 
Quantile 
Maximum N 
WOit 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 805 
INCOMEit 0.04 0.14 -0.88 0.01 0.04 0.09 1.28 805 
OCFit 0.09 0.11 -0.59 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.54 805 
MTBit 2.56 2.48 -1.84 1.28 1.93 2.92 28.57 805 
BIGBATHit -0.03 0.07 -0.79 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 805 
INCSMOOTHit 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 1.58 805 
DTAit 20.82 16.50 0.00 6.74 18.74 31.69 98.02 805 
MCit 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 412 
EBBit 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 400 
FIRMSIZEit 14.10 1.89 9.45 12.77 13.86 15.05 19.38 805 
BIG4it 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 805 
LISTINGit 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 805 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample observations.  
Variable definitions:               
WOit = an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i recognized a write-off in t and 0 otherwise 
INCOMEit = net income of company i in t corrected for impairment losses recognized by company i in t divided by 
total assets of company i in t - 1 of company i in t 
OCFit = the operating cash flow from company i in t divided by total assets of company i in t–1 
MTBit = the market-to-book ratio of company i in t 
BIGBATHit = proxy for unexpectedly low earnings equal to EMI if EMI<0 and 0 otherwise 
INCSMOOTHit = proxy for unexpectedly high earnings equal to EMI if EMI>0 and 0 otherwise 
DTAit = the total debt of company i in t divided by total assets of company i in t 
MCit = an indicator variable equal to 1 if a management change occurred at company i in t and 0 otherwise 
EBBit = an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i’s management received earnings-based bonus payments in t 
and 0 otherwise 
FIRMSIZEit = the natural logarithm of the total assets of company i in t 
BIG4it = an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i was audited by a Big Four audit company 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst & Young, Deloitte) in t and 0 otherwise 
LISTINGit = an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i was listed on a foreign stock exchange in t and 0 otherwise 
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Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics Separated By Write-Off And Non-Write-Off Firm-Years 
  Non-Write-Off Firm-Years (N=319) 
 
Write-Off Firm-Years (N=486) 
  
Mean 
(P-Value) 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation  
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
INCOMEit 0.07 0.06 0.14  
0.02 0.03 0.14 
  (0.000) 
      
OCFit 0.10 0.09 0.13  
0.08 0.08 0.09 
  (0.144) 
      
MTBit 2.69 1.98 2.22  
2.47 1.88 2.63 
  (0.217) 
      
BIGBATHit -0.02 0.00 0.08  
-0.03 0.00 0.07 
  (0.719) 
      
INCSMOOTHit 0.05 0.01 0.14  
0.05 0.01 0.10 
  (0.370) 
      
DTAit 16.38 13.69 14.74  
23.74 21.88 16.95 
  (0.000) 
      
MCit 0.19 0.00 0.39  
0.29 0.00 0.45 
  (0.031) 
      
EBBit 0.90 1.00 0.31  
0.80 1.00 0.40 
  (0.012) 
      
FIRMSIZEit 13.18 13.04 1.46  
14.70 14.45 1.91 
  (0.000) 
      
BIG4it 0.75 1.00 0.43  
0.88 1.00 0.32 
  (0.000) 
      
LISTINGit 0.05 0.00 0.22  
0.14 0.00 0.35 
  (0.000) 
      
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics differentiated by write-off and non-write-off firm-years. Significance levels of differences 
in means are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4:  Correlation Analysis 
  WOit INCOMEit OCFit MTBit BIGBATHit INCSMOOTHit DTAit MCit EBBit FIRMSIZEit BIG4it LISTINGit 
WOit 1.000 -0.229 -0.062 -0.065 -0.049 -0.062 0.223 0.107 -0.126 0.418 0.177 0.141 
  
 
(0.000) (0.079) (0.064) (0.165) (0.079) (0.000) (0.031) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INCOMEit -0.193 1.000 0.492 0.450 0.415 0.404 -0.344 -0.137 0.085 -0.105 -0.029 -0.036 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.091) (0.003) (0.415) (0.307) 
OCFit -0.052 0.417 1.000 0.387 0.189 0.175 -0.190 -0.093 0.000 -0.048 0.008 0.026 
  (0.144) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.994) (0.174) (0.824) (0.463) 
MTBit -0.044 0.295 0.301 1.000 0.271 0.294 -0.200 -0.039 0.049 -0.114 -0.019 -0.057 
  (0.217) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.433) (0.326) (0.001) (0.586) (0.108) 
BIGBATHit -0.013 0.371 0.178 -0.004 1.000 0.709 -0.075 -0.071 -0.001 0.030 0.030 -0.018 
  (0.719) (0.000) (0.000) (0.900) 
 
(0.000) (0.033) (0.151) (0.982) (0.392) (0.393) (0.605) 
INCSMOOTHit -0.032 0.407 0.030 0.173 0.151 1.000 -0.197 -0.027 -0.041 -0.188 -0.008 -0.067 
  (0.370) (0.000) (0.399) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.588) (0.415) (0.000) (0.829) (0.058) 
DTAit 0.218 -0.318 -0.146 -0.089 -0.033 -0.110 1.000 0.081 -0.098 0.344 -0.043 0.105 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.351) (0.002) 
 
(0.102) (0.051) (0.000) (0.221) (0.003) 
MCit 0.107 -0.078 -0.090 0.071 0.011 -0.030 0.103 1.000 -0.094 -0.033 -0.030 0.038 
  (0.031) (0.113) (0.069) (0.153) (0.823) (0.541) (0.036) 
 
(0.117) (0.499) (0.541) (0.448) 
EBBit -0.126 0.090 -0.009 0.042 -0.040 0.003 -0.089 -0.094 1.000 0.005 -0.145 0.074 
  (0.012) (0.073) (0.856) (0.403) (0.428) (0.952) (0.074) (0.117) 
 
(0.927) (0.004) (0.143) 
FIRMSIZEit 0.394 0.022 -0.011 -0.148 0.108 -0.159 0.263 -0.008 0.026 1.000 0.290 0.404 
  (0.000) (0.536) (0.764) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.879) (0.609) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4it 0.177 -0.004 0.057 0.011 0.027 -0.031 -0.089 -0.030 -0.145 0.280 1.000 0.153 
  (0.000) (0.911) (0.105) (0.763) (0.449) (0.388) (0.011) (0.541) (0.004) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
LISTINGit 0.141 -0.001 0.011 -0.085 0.033 -0.055 0.092 0.038 0.074 0.508 0.153 1.000 
  (0.000) (0.969) (0.763) (0.016) (0.351) (0.120) (0.009) (0.448) (0.143) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Table 4 exhibits the pair wise Pearson correlation coefficients in the lower left triangle. Pair wise Spearman correlation coefficients are provided in the upper right triangle. 
Significance levels are reported below in parenthesis. 
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Table 5:  Panel Probit Regression Results 
  
 
Model 1 Model 2  
(including MC) 
Model 3 
(including EBB) 
  
Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(Z-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(Z-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(Z-Statistic) 
  
 
N=805 N=412 N=400 
CONSTANT +/- -8.219*** -7.228*** -9.0137*** 
  
 
(-6.95) (-4.89) (-4.02) 
IMPAIRMENT 
    
INCOMEit - -5.251*** -3.842*** -9.763*** 
  
 
(-6.39) (-3.92) (-4.16) 
OCFit - 1.070 0.531 -0.128 
  
 
(1.35) (0.55) (-0.10) 
MTBit - 0.071* 0.045 0.162* 
  
 
(1.79) (0.93) (1.73) 
REPORTING INCENTIVES       
BIGBATHit - 0.491 -1.183 -3.966 
  
 
(0.46) (-0.90) (-1.14) 
INCSMOOTHit + 2.785*** 1.872** 6.879*** 
  
 
(4.15) (2.32) (3.21) 
DTAit - 0.004 0.005 -0.014 
  
 
(0.66) (0.53) (-1.10) 
MCit + -- 0.245 -- 
  
 
-- (1.07) -- 
EBBit + -- -- -0.685 
  
 
-- -- (-1.58) 
CONTROL VARIABLES       
FIRMSIZEit + 0.574*** 0.463*** 0.643*** 
  
 
(6.57) (4.46) (3.97) 
BIG4it + 0.323 0.992** 0.895 
  
 
(1.07) (2.04) (1.58) 
LISTINGit + -0.755* -0.579 -0.998 
  
 
(-1.69) (-1.31) (-1.63) 
Log Likelihood 
 
-382.710 -188.209 -171.619 
Wald-statistic 
 
0.000 0.000 0.001 
Percent correctly predicted 0.709 0.684 0.699 
McFadden‘s Pseudo R2 0.292 0.272 0.329 
Table 5 shows the panel probit regression results using random effects with clustered robust standard errors. The total sample 
used in Model 1 consists of 805 firm-year observations. The reduced sample used in Model 2 contains all German companies 
listed in HDAX between 2004 and 2010 for which a complete Worldscope dataset and sufficient information concerning 
management changes was available. The sample consists of 412 firm-year observations. The reduced sample used in Model 3 
contains all German companies listed in HDAX between 2004 and 2010 for which a complete Worldscope dataset and sufficient 
information concerning earnings-based bonus payments was available. The sample consists of 400 firm-year observations. 
Parameter estimates are based on the following models: 
 
Model 1:         
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Model 3: 
 
  
 
        
          
          
          
 
*** ** * denotes significance at <0.01, <0.05, <0.1 levels, respectively.   
 
Table 6:  Sensitivity Analysis 
  
 
 
Model 1 
with ROAit 
 
Model 1 
with SALESit 
Model 1 
with 
MTBCHANGEit 
 
Model 1 
Logit 
Model 1 
excluding 
2005 
  
Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(Z-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(Z-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(Z-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(Z-Statistic) 
Coefficient 
(Z-Statistic) 
  
 
N=805 N=805 N=805 N=805 N=721 
CONSTANT +/- -7.807*** -7.974*** -7.815*** -14.543*** -8.591*** 
  
 
(-6.64) (-6.49) (-6.76) (-6.77) (-6.68) 
IMPAIRMENT 
      
INCOMEit - -- -4.908*** -5.06*** -9.918*** -5.227*** 
  
 
-- (-6.10) (-6.09) (-6.07) (-6.05) 
ROAit - -0.048*** -- -- -- -- 
  
 
(-5.24) -- -- -- -- 
OCFit - 0.824 -- 1.34* 1.899 0.934 
  
 
(1.05) -- (1.69) (1.34) (1.11) 
SALESit - -- -0.880 -- -- -- 
  
 
-- (-0.58) -- -- -- 
REPORTING INCENTIVES 
MTBit - 0.055 0.082** -- 0.135* 0.063 
  
 
(1.39) (2.02) -- (1.86) (1.54) 
MTBCHANGEit + -- -- -0.027 -- -- 
  
 
-- -- (-0.33) -- -- 
BIGBATHit - 0.581 0.599 0.318 0.977 0.309 
  
 
(0.53) (0.56) (0.30) (0.50) (0.28) 
INCSMOOTHit + 2.255*** 2.640*** 2.912*** 5.635*** 2.871*** 
  
 
(3.40) (3.93) (4.33) (4.03) (4.14) 
DTAit - 0.100 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 
  
 
(1.53) (0.60) (0.79) (0.54) (0.54) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
     
FIRMSIZEit + 0.542*** 0.570*** 0.551*** 1.015*** 0.602*** 
  
 
(6.26) (6.43) (6.41) (6.42) (6.31) 
BIG4it + 0.371 0.322 0.371 0.587 0.369 
  
 
(1.21) (1.06) (1.23) (1.11) (1.17) 
LISTINGit + -0.693 -0.765* -0.741* -1.345* -0.912* 
  
 
(-1.53) (-1.70) (-1.66) (-1.70) (-1.93) 
Log Likelihood 
 
-390.960 -383.465 -384.417 -381.662 -343.635 
Wald-statistic 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden's Pseudo R2 0.277 0.291 0.289 0.294 0.290 
*** ** * denotes significance at <0.01, <0.05, <0.1 levels respectively. 
Table 6 shows our sensitivity analysis. We based our sensitivity tests on our model 1 with a sample size of 805 firm-year 
observations. The exclusion of 2005 reduces the sample to 721 firm-years. Parameter estimates are based on model 1 described in 
Table 5 with the variations indicated in the header of the table. 
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